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The EU and the Western Balkans: 
So Near and Yet So Far 
Why the Region Needs Fast-Track Socio-Economic Convergence with the EU 
Matteo Bonomi and Dušan Reljić 
The European Commission will unveil its new EU Enlargement Strategy on February 6th, 
2018. Since relations with Turkey have deteriorated markedly, only the Western Balkan 
states remain candidates for EU membership. The EU High Representative for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, has stated the European Commission’s 
intention to ensure that the Western Balkan countries are on an “irreversible” track 
to membership in the Union before the end of its mandate in 2019. Unless the new En-
largement Strategy offers a realistic plan to tackle the lack of economic growth and 
social progress in the region, it will be another futile institutional exercise because 
democracy, the rule of law and other basic distinctions of “Europeanness” cannot make 
lasting inroads into the enduring poverty in the Western Balkans. 
 
In the past two decades, the Western Bal-
kan countries have largely enacted the 
fundamental economic reforms requested 
by the European Union (EU), the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) under the so-called “Washington 
consensus”, following the matrix previously 
created for Central-Eastern Europe (CEE). 
They have opened their markets to the EU, 
privatised and liberalised their economies, 
and imposed austerity policies during the 
post-crisis period. The idea behind the 
“Washington consensus” was for the re-
forms, in combination with the progressive 
adoption of EU laws, principles and activi-
ties in the framework of the EU’s enlarge-
ment policy, to create functioning market 
economies, foster democratic institutions 
and pave the way for EU membership. 
Things have turned out differently from 
the transition blueprint that was envisaged 
for the Western Balkans, however. The 
expectations that these countries would 
gradually converge towards EU economic 
standards and become consolidated democ-
racies have not been met. 
Without doubt, the transition in CEE has 
not been a complete success story either. 
Leaving aside political considerations about 
the state of democracy in some CEE coun-
tries, and in purely economic terms, it is 
evident that only those in the CEE region 
that started from better economic condi-
tions, notably the Czech Republic and 
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Slovenia, have come close to reaching the 
living standards of the poorer countries of 
Western Europe. The economic perfor-
mance of the Western Balkans has been 
particularly disappointing, even when 
compared to the relatively modest results 
in CEE. 
Western Balkan states such as Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and Serbia are in the 
group of countries that are worst off in 
terms of income inequality and recovery of 
their pre-transition GDP. These two coun-
tries, together with Montenegro, have not 
yet reached their real 1989 GDP level. If we 
look at the average GDP per capita in Pur-
chasing Power Parities (PPP) in 2016, the six 
Western Balkan countries had not reached 
28 per cent of the level in the old EU mem-
ber states (the so-called EU15), while CEE 
was at around 60 per cent of the EU15 
average. 
The Western Balkans’ inability to benefi-
cially integrate with the EU economy can 
be illustrated by their limited overall ex-
ports, particularly of manufactured goods. 
Exports of goods and services as a share of 
GDP represent a low 30 percent on average 
in the Western Balkans. This is far below 
the 80 percent averaged by similar-sized 
transition economies now in the EU. More-
over, manufacturing exports of the Western 
Balkans are less sophisticated, since the 
region still confines itself to labour and 
resource-intensive products. Whereas in 
CEE, the early arrival of foreign direct 
investments has favoured the transfer of 
capital, know-how and modern technology, 
thereby also facilitating re-industrialisa-
tion, in the Western Balkans, most coun-
tries have experienced almost three decades 
of continuous deindustrialisation. 
Closer Economic Ties to the EU, 
but with Negative Results 
Faced with these sobering results, the IMF, 
World Bank and other international orga-
nisations usually point to “reform fatigue” 
and vested interests within the Western 
Balkans to explain the poor economic per-
formance and loss of reform momentum. 
Yet such a narrow focus is not entirely 
adequate, since it does not take into ac-
count the long-term causes of the current 
economic, social and political situation. 
When in the early 2000s the international 
strategies towards the Western Balkans 
region changed dramatically, the overall 
political and economic conditions in the 
region were far worse than in CEE in 1989. 
The legacy of a disintegrating Yugoslavia 
and the ensuing wars in the 1990s meant 
that potential EU candidates in the Balkans 
adopted the EU integration path, with 
rapid market opening and economic inte-
gration with the EU. This path was em-
barked upon despite devastated industrial 
capacities, thriving shadow economies, 
extremely weak states marked by dysfunc-
tional public administrations, widespread 
corruption and unsatisfactory education 
and health systems and other socio-eco-
nomic flaws. 
While economic performance did im-
prove, the strong growth during 2001-08 
was primarily based on the inflow of for-
eign capital without leading to profound 
economic restructuring and modernisation. 
The institutions that governments tried to 
put in place to regulate the markets and 
safeguard competition were inefficient, 
often leaving tycoon capitalists a free hand 
to exercise quasi-monopolistic power. At 
the same time, foreign investors mainly 
targeted the non-tradable sectors, contrib-
uting to deindustrialisation, insufficient 
job creation and widening trade deficits. 
The unsustainability of the growth 
model in the Western Balkans became fully 
apparent when the global financial and 
economic crisis in 2008/2009 hit the region 
badly. The Balkan countries were particu-
larly affected by the crisis due to their al-
ready strong integration with the EU. As a 
result, the growth of the last ten years has 
been nullified, while during the same peri-
od these countries accumulated a trade 
deficit with the EU of 97 billion euro (2005-
16) paralleled by increasing foreign debt. 
Whereas a substantial part of the Western 
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Balkans’ GDP is transferred yearly to core 
EU countries such as Germany and Italy 
through trade deficits and the repayment 
of loans to Western banks, Western Balkan 
countries, unlike the new EU members, do 
not qualify for the EU structural funds or 
other grants that would alleviate the im-
pact of the economic crises and foster 
growth. Funds from the EU’s Instrument 
for Pre-accession Assistance range from 
around 40 million euro a year for Monte-
negro to 200 million euro for Serbia and 
are directed almost entirely to supporting 
administrative and other institutional re-
forms, without sufficiently taking account 
of the enormous development gap between 
the Western Balkans and the EU. 
All in all, almost two decades of EU-
Balkan economic integration have led to a 
pronounced dependency on the EU. Today, 
from a socio-economic perspective, the pre-
accession countries in the Balkans already 
appear to be part of the European club – 
but with many disadvantages and no voting 
rights. The Western Balkans have 73% of 
their total goods trade with the EU within 
an almost completely liberalised trade 
regime. Between 75-90% of their banking 
systems are foreign-owned (mainly by Ger-
man, Italian, French, Austrian and Greek 
banks). Almost all countries have adopted 
fixed exchange-rate regimes, formally or 
de facto linking their currencies to the euro 
or using the euro (Kosovo, Montenegro). 
However, close economic ties with the EU 
have not helped economic modernisation 
to take hold or the Western Balkans’ capaci-
ty to develop. Despite being so close to the 
EU, the region remains a long way from 
achieving stability and prosperity and thus 
firmly embarking on the road to successful 
European integration. 
Precarious Decades Lie Ahead 
Today, just as economic recovery in Europe 
is starting to take root, timing is critical 
to consolidate growth and establish a sus-
tainable development path. Securing the 
political support of the population for the 
further reforms required by the EU acces-
sion process depends on it. Yet the chal-
lenges facing the Western Balkans are com-
plex and formidable. To date, even under 
the most optimistic economic forecasts, the 
expected average Western Balkans’ GDP 
growth rate of around 3 percent is insuf-
ficient to accelerate the process of catching-
up and convergence. A recent estimation 
by the World Bank indicates that at current 
growth rates, it would take about six de-
cades for average per capita Western Balkan 
income to converge with the EU average. 
With faster growth of 5 to 6 percent, con-
vergence could be achieved by the end of 
the 2030s. 
This means that by then, broad sections 
of the population would have spent over 
half a century in poverty and precarious 
socio-economic conditions. It should there-
fore come as no surprise that the “EU 
model” is being questioned by a considera-
ble part of the populace, who are less and 
less convinced that this model is the univer-
sal remedy for all political and economic 
troubles. This view is at odds with the domi-
nant political discourse, both in the region 
and among external Western actors. This 
disparity opens inroads for other political 
and economic concepts that, as a rule, tend 
to be populist and authoritarian. 
The current political and economic de-
bate focuses on the need for a new growth 
model for the Western Balkans and insists 
on the need to reform domestic institu-
tions. However, it is far from clear what this 
means in terms of concrete policies. Inter-
national organisations such as the World 
Bank and the IMF have advocated a further 
reduction in the size and role of the state, 
usually pointing to the need for the West-
ern Balkans to improve the business envi-
ronment as one of the key elements to 
attract more foreign investment and drive 
economic development. The position 
adopted by the EU is slightly different in 
that it has embraced a broader notion of 
what reforming domestic institutions 
entails. Since 2014-15, especially, with the 
EU’s new approach to economic governance 
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towards the enlargement countries and the 
launch of the Berlin process, more empha-
sis is being placed on improving in the 
quality of state apparatus and the entire 
policy cycle, together with longer-term 
structural reforms. 
After over fifteen years of experimenta-
tion with neo-liberal economic prescrip-
tions, strengthening economic governance 
in the Western Balkans seems to be one of 
the key factors to accelerate economic 
growth and development. Infrastructure 
projects should be supplemented by addi-
tional investments in health, social ser-
vices, education and research and develop-
ment, which in turn could facilitate the 
development of smarter and more know-
ledge-based economies, together with better 
access to resources for small and medium-
sized enterprises. 
The EU’s “Soft Belly” Needs 
Attention 
A glance at the map of Europe shows that 
the region is not the EU’s south-eastern 
courtyard but rather its overlooked soft 
belly – surrounded by EU and NATO mem-
ber states. Also, all essential political out-
comes in the region over the last three 
decades were masterminded and micro-
managed by the EU and the Western allies. 
Only recognition from Brussels and other 
EU capitals of the Balkans for what they 
genuinely are – namely an integral part of 
core Europe and the European integration 
project – can offer a way forward. In this 
respect, a more flexible and differentiated 
approach towards the Balkans is required 
to improve the current enlargement policy. 
This approach could pragmatically advance 
sectoral integration and provide the mis-
sing link between present conditions and 
their eventual date of entry into the EU. 
In concrete policy terms, the EU should: 
 (1) mobilise resources for the Western 
Balkans that are proportional to their 
level of market integration, with the EU 
considering ways to open structural 
funds even before accession, or provide 
similar amounts of funds through re-
gional or similar projects. These would 
also be beneficial to the ring of EU 
countries around the Western Balkans 
(primarily targeting infrastructure, 
transport, energy and environment 
protection); 
 (2) extend the use of EU financial stabili-
ty mechanisms to the region, taking into 
consideration that the local banking 
system is largely owned by banks from 
the EU; 
 (3) include the Western Balkans in the 
EU digital market and free roaming to 
facilitate business contacts and other 
trans-border initiatives; 
 (4) expand cooperation in education and 
research and innovation policies (Hori-
zon2020, Erasmus) with a focus on the 
developmental needs of the region; 
 (5) enable a stronger integration for their 
labour markets to favour circular migra-
tion and the return of economic mi-
grants; 
 (6) explore ways to include the Western 
Balkans in EU policies and actions in the 
field of justice and home affairs. 
Given the small size of the Balkan countries 
(merely 3.6% of EU’s population), measures 
in this direction would have a limited over-
all impact on EU member states, but they 
could go a long way towards restoring the 
credibility of EU policies in the region. It is 
in the EU’s own economic interests to make 
the region more attractive for trade and 
investment, and to link the transport, 
energy and digital networks of the entire 
south-eastern Europe area. This would also 
lessen migration pressures. The potential 
political gains are obvious too: strengthen-
ing security in south-eastern Europe would 
boost the EU’s standing in a new era of 
geopolitics, when China, Russia, Turkey 
and certain Islamic states also vie for in-
fluence in the region. The next EU institu-
tional cycle, starting in 2019 with the 
election of the new European Parliament, 
a new Commission and the adoption of the 
new EU budget, should also bring about a 
reformed enlargement policy. 
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